Russian Geopolitical
Strategy[1]
The Russian foreign policy of “The
near abroad”
The silent plot of Czar Vladimir
Arguing
about the foreign policy of Russia, look back to the long roots of historical phenomena
is the first step to take.
The last European empire was
born in the XVII Century by the hands of the illuminated emperor Peter the
Great, evolving its shape and extension during the centuries, alterning openings
and closures to the Western Europe. Since its emergence until its collapse in
1991, the St. Petersburg-Moscow axis has always been its core and Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine the gravity’s center. In this regard, the four geopolitical
areas that always have drawn Russia’s strategic interest are Eastern Europe,
Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia reaching
as its farther extent the Central Germany while dominating all the
territories until the Chinese border.
From the very beginning until
now, Russia has presented the typical
empire’s elements such as tendency to expansion and dynamic border as it is
testify by American attempts to redraw them, a strong central power – Czars,
Soviet Government, “Putinized”
Presidency – force of expansion. The project is under way even if has
suffered several setbacks, of which the most strong was the Soviet Union’s
collapse.
Another typical feature of the
empire Russia shows to have is to build its power even on an intangible
element, the prestige. Undeniably, collapsing in 1991Russia has lost it
reaching the lowest level during the Kosovo’s war in 1998. Counting on its
prestige – a mixture of political and military credibility, intimidation
potential – asking the Americans not to intervene, Breznev was stating the
Russian longa munus on the ex
Yugoslavia, a kind of influence even if in the Balkans it was over long before
1991 but in the Fifties with schism of Tito. NATO’s intervention breaks Russian
claims and expectations. In the same year ruble’s crisis, severe recession,
worsening of living standards and flight of capital abroad.
As a phoenix, Russia is reborn
from its ashes, recovering Putin the ideals that were of Gorbaciov: Glasnost
and Perestrojka. In politics since 1991, Presiden t of the Russian Federation
from 2000 to 2008 Putin has resumed the reconstruction project Breznev and
Yeltsin have not been able to bring forward.
Two happenings are
particularly indicative to better explain Putin’s choices in the light of the
recent past and current events: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and
Russo-Georgian war of 2008. The Ukrainian street protest asking for
transparency and democracy during the presidential elections was a leap
forward, unexpected and powerful, threatening the Russian influence on the area
and shifting the regional objectives westwards. Even if the effected has been
faded, the happening convinced Putin of the need of a strong leadership to save
and rebuilt Russia and its empire.
The opportunity to give a
strong signal to the International Community proving the power of Russia and
the vacuousness of the American saving ubiquity arrived with the Russo-Georgian
war in 2008.
The signal has been received
laud and clear not only from Georgia but from Ukraine too and from all the Countries
in the past belonging to the Soviet Union.
The return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency provides us with
insights into how Moscow might attempt to increase leverage in its former
sphere of influence over the next 5-10 years.
Remaking the Union
Putin developed
a strategy divided in three principles: the first assumes the security system
as heart of the state, the second Moscow
heart of Russia and the third one that Russia was the heart of the
former Soviet Union and will be the heart of the remade Union as well. Most
important, he cautiously moved Russia back to first among equals where the
logic behind is to take advantage of relationships on a roughly mutual basis
without undertaking responsibility for the other nations. Ultimately, willingness
to economical alignment and inter-connection “free of charge”.
The strategy has two intensity
levels corresponding to two different and concentric areas. Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine belonging to the first area where the economical and
political influence is very strong. Moldova, Baltic States, Ex Yugoslavia,
Poland, Czech Republic and for certain aspects Germany belonging to the second
one where the ties with Russia – economic, political and the general
conditioning- are by far smaller than in the first area.
Given the overall object, the Russia’s strategy moves on two floors which
turn into different bets. There is not a first or second table as they progress
simultaneously. On one hand remaking the Union, on the other one keeping US and
Europe away from its own geopolitical areas of interest.
Remaking the union is a strategic necessity for Russia. Russia needs the economic integration given its traditional economic
strategy, which is the export of raw materials, especially energy. Aligning
with states such as Kazakhstan in energy and Ukraine in grain provides Moscow
with leverage in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe. The other face
of alignment is trade inside the former Republics area. It is currently
estimated that almost 70% of Russia’s export receipts are made up of transfer
of natural resources, with the former Soviet space being recipient of
end-products. The heart of Russian strategy is to create a system of
relationships within the former Soviet Union that will provide economic
alignment and strategic depth but not give Russia an unsustainable obligation
to underwrite the other nations' domestic policies. The crowing of economic
alignment is the Russian Custom Union which is emerging, as free market and
facilities along the lines of European one.
The strong economic tie with
the ex Soviet Republics with the security issue is the reason basis for the
planned reunion.
Focusing on the political side
of the strategy only, one of the most ambitious project promoted by Putin is
the Eurasia Union, tying
together Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, a large economic and military part of
the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is the missing element and a long, complex
political and economic game is under way where considered its importance to
Russia in terms of energy revenues, workforce and national security. Yet
despite increasingly warmer ties between Kiev and Moscow, Ukraine continues to
develop political and economic relations with the Eu, being on the verge of
signing a major trade agreement with Eu, rising de facto as the most
interesting zone of competition between Russia and the Eu.
Security is
the second most important issue concerning the “remaking process”. It is fully
political, or matter of geography in political function. What is certain is
that Russia wants safe borders, trying for this reason to keep in its sphere of
influence, out of NATO system, the nearest countries. Countries considered
security cordon are the same as the Custom Union, the most important ex RSS.
Boundaries Russia wants to
strengthen are the Western, following the old but apparently not anachronistic
East-West confrontation. More concretely, Poland has agreed to host the
ballistic missile defense system. Even if it is not a real threat, is a danger
to boundaries and Nation’s integrity. It is still a move on the chessboard.
Concerning the
security issue, two scenarios are the hottest: Ukraine and Moldova. After the
Orange revolution Ukraine – undoubtedly in a strategic position for Russia’s
geographical safety - is less and less available giving up with the cooperation
with European union, alterning opening and closures’ signal regarding both
Russia and Eu. Thus it is not inconceivable its future accession to NATO.
Moldova is
standing in the same situation, yanked from Russia and Romania, NATO’s member,
but its situation is more critical. On one hand the Russian 4th army is stationed in the self-proclaimed majority
Russian state of Trans Dniestra while Moscow provides financial assistance to
the Government of Tiraspol. At the same time Russia maintains strong bilateral
trade links with Moldova and there are calls for the country to join the
Russia’s nascent Custom Union. On the other one, the Eu member Romania which
shares language, culture and history with, is pressing to see Moldova actively
coopering if not join the Union.
Once again,
looking from above the geographical map of Europe and Asia, two concentric
areas are visible: all Countries belonging to the first area are ex RSS and not
NATO’s members. All Countries belonging to the second area are NATO’s members
and fully-fledged European members or becoming members.
At third, the traditional strength of Russia, the energy policy. Moscow has the potential to use its energy supplies such as gas, oil and
electricity to maintain a strategic foothold and political leverage in Central
and Eastern Europe. Russia remains the largest supplier of energy to the Eu and
particularly to Eastern Europe, using it as the major foreign policy instrument
maintaining the control on the area as it happened against Kiev on at least two
occasion in the past six years .
Confirming the strategic
importance of those countries, the current efforts to maintain them depending
on Russian supplies. Where they try to become independent on the energy needs,
Russia moves its checkers. It is as the Ignalina nuclear plant’s
decommissioning, indirectly slowed by Russia, or once planned the construction of another nuclear plant in Lithuania, the
Russian countermove stating the construction of two nuclear plants, one in the
Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and the other one in Belarus, faster and
stronger, de facto surrounding the Baltic States.
Despite Russia’s efforts, many
Central and Eastern European states have set themselves a multi-vector future
course that is not strictly focused on their former Soviet master.
Nevertheless, Russia still has enough energy reserves to continue challenging
these arrangements and in a short-medium term logic it has leverage enough to keep
them within its sphere of influence.
“But to what extent do the former Soviet republics look to their old
imperial master for security and economic cooperation?”[2]
Briefly and by way of summary, below are shown three different tendencies
synthesizing the main attitudes towards Russia, crossing the two concentric spheres
this article talked about above. Given the Russian leverage more or less strong
in all the Countries considered, poles apart are the Baltic States and the ex SSR
of Belarus and Kazakhstan. Fully-fledged members of Eu since 2004 the first
three, working for the European integration process sharing its values,
economical or ideological they are and securely pro-Russian the seconds, dependants
on Russia and ready to join the integration process within Eurasia Union and
Custom Union. The third and middle category concerns the “unsettled States”
such as Ukraine and Moldova where strong are felt contrasting forces.
The second
of the two “game tables” mentioned above regards the possible obstacles to “remaking
the Union” Strategy, turning into two others as well.
Since the beginning of war in
Iraq and then in Afghanistan, the US were almost completely absorbed and
focused on the Middle East. If not ignoring, disregarding the developments of
Russian foreign policy, which was an opportunity for Russia to stabilize itself
and increase its regional power. Russia must keep the US distracted and its
support strategy of the Syrian Government and more generally in the Middle East
serves that purpose.
The European economic crisis
is a godsend for Russia as well and in this scenario
drawing Germany into a mutually beneficial economic relationship would be the
“tremendous achievement” of Russia on this second table. Surely the current
situation is awkward for Germany and it cannot be excluded the European
economical power start looking for new economical partners to relieve on
pressure and to create new possibilities other than Europe. Moreover, Germany
depends on Russian gas supplies. “Recruiting” Germany would be a great move on
a chessboard where the US settled an antiballistic plant in Poland.
Ultimately, everything the Russian
foreign (shortly domestic?) policy needs, is to buy time to complete its
evolution.
Valentina Lonardi
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