Russian Geopolitical
Strategy[1]
The Russian foreign policy of “The
near abroad”
The silent plot of Czar Vladimir
Arguing
about the foreign policy of Russia, look back to the long roots of historical phenomena
is the first step to take.
The last European empire was
born in the XVII Century by the hands of the illuminated emperor Peter the
Great, evolving its shape and extension during the centuries, alterning openings
and closures to the Western Europe. Since its emergence until its collapse in
1991, the St. Petersburg-Moscow axis was its core and Russia, Belarus and
Ukraine the gravity’s center. In this regard, the four geopolitical areas that
have always drawn Russia’s strategic interest are Eastern Europe, Central Asia,
the Caucasus and Siberia reaching as its
farther extent the Central Germany while dominating all the territories until
the Chinese border.
From the very beginning until
now, Russia has presented the typical
empire’s elements such as tendency to expansion and dynamic border, a strong
central power – Czars, Soviet Government, “Putinized” Presidency – force of expansion. The project
is under way even if has suffered several setbacks, the strongest of them was
the Soviet Union’s collapse.
Another typical feature of the
empire Russia shows to have is to build its power even on an intangible
element, the prestige. Undeniably, collapsing in 1991 Russia lost it, reaching
the lowest level during the Kosovo’s war in 1998. Counting on its prestige – a
mixture of political and military credibility, intimidation potential – asking
the Americans not to intervene, Breznev was stating the Russian longa munus on the former Yugoslavia, a
kind of influence even if in the Balkans it was over long before 1991. NATO’s
intervention broke Russian claims and expectations. The same year ruble’s
crisis, severe recession, worsening of living standards and flight of capital
abroad.
As a phoenix, Russia is reborn
from its ashes. Putin recovered the ideals that had been of Gorbaciov: Glasnost
and Perestrojka. In politics since 1991, President of the Russian Federation
from 2000 to 2008, Putin has resumed the reconstruction project Breznev and
Yeltsin have not been able to bring forward.
Two happenings are
particularly indicative to better explain Putin’s choices in the light of the
recent past and current events: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and
Russo-Georgian war of 2008. The Ukrainian street protest asking for
transparency and democracy during the presidential elections was a leap
forward, unexpected and powerful, threatening the Russian influence in the area
and shifting the regional objectives westwards. Even if the effect faded, the
happening convinced Putin that Russia needs a strong leadership to be re-built
as its new imperial project.
The opportunity to give a
strong signal to the International Community proving the power of Russia and
the vacuousness of the American “saving ubiquity” arrived with the
Russo-Georgian war in 2008.
The signal has been received
laud and clear not only from Georgia but from Ukraine too and from all the
Countries in the past belonging to the Soviet Union.
The return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency provides us with
insights into how Moscow might attempt to increase leverage in its former
sphere of influence over the next 5-10 years.
Remaking the Union
Putin developed
a strategy divided in three principles: the first assumes the security system
as heart of the state, the second Moscow
as heart of Russia and the third one that Russia was the heart of the
former Soviet Union and will be the heart of the remade Union as well. Most
important, he cautiously moved Russia back to first among equals where the
logic behind is to take advantage of relationships on a roughly mutual basis
without undertaking responsibility for the other nations.
The strategy has two intensity
levels corresponding to two different and concentric areas. Russia, Belarus,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine belonging to the first area where the economical and
political influence is very strong. Moldova, Baltic States, former Yugoslavia,
Poland, Czech Republic and for certain aspects Germany belonging to the second
one where the ties with Russia – economic, political and the general
conditioning- are by far weaker than in the first area.
Given the overall object, the Russia’s strategy moves on two floors, which
turn into different bets. There is not a first or second table as they progress
simultaneously. On one hand remake the Union, on the other one keep US and
Europe away from its own geopolitical areas of interest.
Remake the union is a strategic necessity for Russia. Russia needs the economic integration given its traditional economic
strategy, which is the export of raw materials, especially energy. Aligning
with states such as Kazakhstan in energy and Ukraine in grain, it provides
Moscow with leverage in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe. The
other face of alignment is trade inside the former Republics’ area. It is
currently estimated that almost 70% of Russia’s export receipts are made up of
transfer of natural resources and the former Soviet space being recipient of
end-products. The heart of Russian strategy is to create a system of
relationships within the former Soviet Union’s Republics that will provide
economic alignment and strategic depth but not give Russia an unsustainable
obligation to underwrite the other nations' domestic policies. The crowing of
economic alignment is the Russian Custom Union, which is emerging as free
market along the lines of European one.
Focusing on the political side
of the strategy only, one of the most ambitious project promoted by Putin is
the Eurasia Union, tying
together Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, a large economic and military part of
the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is the missing element and a long, complex,
political and economic game is under way considering its importance to Russia
in terms of energy revenues, workforce and national security. But despite
increasingly warmer ties between Kiev and Moscow, Ukraine continues to develop
political and economic relations with the Eu, being on the verge of signing a
major trade agreement with Eu. Ukraine
is the most interesting zone of competition between Russia and the Eu and it is
fully aware of its strategic power.
Security is
the second most important issue concerning the “remaking process”, which ties
tight together Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Aiming to have safe
borders Russia is trying to hold in its sphere of influence the nearest
countries out of NATO’s system, which are the same as the Custom Union, the
most important RSS.
Russia wants to strengthen the
Western boundaries, following the old but apparently not anachronistic
East-West confrontation. More concretely, Poland agreed to host the ballistic
missile defense system. Even if it is not a real threat, it is perceived
threatening the Russian boundaries and Nation’s integrity. It is still a move
on the chessboard.
Concerning the
security issue, two scenarios are the hottest: Ukraine and Moldova. After the
Orange revolution Ukraine is less and less available giving up with the
cooperation with European union, alterning opening and closures’ signals
regarding both Russia and Eu. Thus it is not inconceivable its future accession
to NATO.
Pulled by Russia
and Romania, NATO’s member, Moldova is standing in a situation even more
critical than Ukraine. On one hand the Russian 4th army is stationed in the self-proclaimed majority
Russian state of Trans Dniestra while Moscow provides financial assistance to
the Government of Tiraspol. At the same time Russia maintains strong bilateral
trade links with Moldova and there are calls for the country to join the
Russia’s nascent Custom Union. On the other one, the Eu member Romania, which
shares language, culture and history with Moldova, is pressing to see the
neighbor actively coopering if not join
the Union.
Once again,
looking from above the geographical map of Europe and Asia, two concentric
areas are visible: the Countries belonging to the first area are former RSS and
not NATO’s members, the others belonging to the second area are NATO’s members
and full-fledged or becoming European members.
At third, the traditional strength of Russia, the energy policy. Moscow has the potential to use its energy supplies such as gas, oil and
electricity to maintain a strategic foothold and political leverage in Central
and Eastern Europe. Russia remains the largest supplier of energy to Eu and
particularly to Eastern Europe, using it as the major foreign policy instrument
maintaining the control on the area as it happened against Kiev on at least two
occasion in the past six years .
Confirming the strategic
importance of those countries, the current efforts to maintain them depending
on Russian supplies. When they try to become independent on the energy needs,
Russia moves its checkers. For instance the indirect slowdown of Ignalina
nuclear plant’s dismissing and on the other hand Russian obstruction to the
construction of another nuclear plant in Lithuania, officially announcing that two
Russian nuclear plants, stronger than the Lithuanian one, would be built faster
in Kaliningrad and Belarus, surrounding the Baltic States.
Despite Russia’s efforts, many
Central and Eastern European states have set themselves a multi-vector future
course that is not strictly focused on their former Soviet master.
Nevertheless, Russia still has enough energy reserves to continue challenging
these arrangements and in a short-medium term logic it has leverage enough to keep
them into its sphere of influence.
“But to what extent do the former Soviet Republics look to their old
imperial master for security and economic cooperation?”[2]
Briefly, below are shown three different tendencies synthesizing the main
attitudes towards Russia, crossing the two concentric spheres this article
talked about above. Given the relatively strong Russian leverage in all the
Countries considered, poles apart are the Baltic States and the former SSR of
Belarus and Kazakhstan. Full-fledged members of Eu since 2004 the first three,
working for the European integration process sharing its values, economical or
ideological they are and pro-Russian the seconds, dependants on Russia and
ready to join the integration process within Eurasia Union and Custom Union.
The third and middle category concerns the “unsettled States” such as Ukraine
and Moldova where are playing contrasting forces.
The second
of the two “game tables” mentioned above regards the possible obstacles to the “remaking
the Union” Strategy, turning into two others as well.
Since the beginning of war in
Iraq and then in Afghanistan, the US were almost completely absorbed and
focused on the Middle East. If not ignoring, disregarding the developments of
Russian foreign policy, which was an opportunity for Russia to stabilize itself
and increase its regional power. Russia must keep the US distracted and its
support strategy to the Syrian government and more broadly in the Middle East serves that purpose.
The European economic crisis
is a godsend for Russia as well and in this scenario
to draw Germany into a mutually beneficial economic relationship would be the
“tremendous achievement” of Russia on this second table. Surely the current
situation is awkward for Germany and it cannot be excluded it will start looking
for new economical partners to relieve on pressure and to create new
possibilities other than Europe. Moreover, Germany depends on Russian gas
supplies.
Ultimately, everything the Russian
foreign (shortly domestic?) policy needs, it is to buy time to complete its
evolution.
Valentina Lonardi
Nessun commento:
Posta un commento