domenica 25 novembre 2012


Russian Geopolitical Strategy[1]

The Russian foreign policy of “The near abroad”

The silent plot of Czar Vladimir

Arguing about the foreign policy of Russia, look back to the long roots of historical phenomena  is the first step to take.
The last European empire was born in the XVII Century by the hands of the illuminated emperor Peter the Great, evolving its shape and extension during the centuries, alterning openings and closures to the Western Europe. Since its emergence until its collapse in 1991, the St. Petersburg-Moscow axis was its core and Russia, Belarus and Ukraine the gravity’s center. In this regard, the four geopolitical areas that have always drawn Russia’s strategic interest are Eastern Europe, Central Asia, the Caucasus and Siberia reaching  as its farther extent the Central Germany while dominating all the territories until the Chinese border.
From the very beginning until now, Russia has presented  the typical empire’s elements such as tendency to expansion and dynamic border, a strong central power – Czars, Soviet Government, “Putinized”  Presidency – force of expansion. The project is under way even if has suffered several setbacks, the strongest of them was the Soviet Union’s collapse.  
Another typical feature of the empire Russia shows to have is to build its power even on an intangible element, the prestige. Undeniably, collapsing in 1991 Russia lost it, reaching the lowest level during the Kosovo’s war in 1998. Counting on its prestige – a mixture of political and military credibility, intimidation potential – asking the Americans not to intervene, Breznev was stating the Russian longa munus on the former Yugoslavia, a kind of influence even if in the Balkans it was over long before 1991. NATO’s intervention broke Russian claims and expectations. The same year ruble’s crisis, severe recession, worsening of living standards and flight of capital abroad.
As a phoenix, Russia is reborn from its ashes. Putin recovered the ideals that had been of Gorbaciov: Glasnost and Perestrojka. In politics since 1991, President of the Russian Federation from 2000 to 2008, Putin has resumed the reconstruction project Breznev and Yeltsin have not been able to bring forward.
Two happenings are particularly indicative to better explain Putin’s choices in the light of the recent past and current events: the Orange Revolution of 2004 and Russo-Georgian war of 2008. The Ukrainian street protest asking for transparency and democracy during the presidential elections was a leap forward, unexpected and powerful, threatening the Russian influence in the area and shifting the regional objectives westwards. Even if the effect faded, the happening convinced Putin that Russia needs a strong leadership to be re-built as its new imperial project.
The opportunity to give a strong signal to the International Community proving the power of Russia and the vacuousness of the American “saving ubiquity” arrived with the Russo-Georgian war in 2008.
The signal has been received laud and clear not only from Georgia but from Ukraine too and from all the Countries in the past belonging to the Soviet Union.
The return of Vladimir Putin to the Russian Presidency provides us with insights into how Moscow might attempt to increase leverage in its former sphere of influence over the next 5-10 years.
Remaking the Union
Putin developed a strategy divided in three principles: the first assumes the security system as heart of the state, the second Moscow  as heart of Russia and the third one that Russia was the heart of the former Soviet Union and will be the heart of the remade Union as well. Most important, he cautiously moved Russia back to first among equals where the logic behind is to take advantage of relationships on a roughly mutual basis without undertaking responsibility for the other nations.
The strategy has two intensity levels corresponding to two different and concentric areas. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine belonging to the first area where the economical and political influence is very strong. Moldova, Baltic States, former Yugoslavia, Poland, Czech Republic and for certain aspects Germany belonging to the second one where the ties with Russia – economic, political and the general conditioning- are by far weaker than in the first area.
Given the overall object, the Russia’s strategy moves on two floors, which turn into different bets. There is not a first or second table as they progress simultaneously. On one hand remake the Union, on the other one keep US and Europe away from its own geopolitical areas of interest. 
Remake the union is a strategic necessity for Russia. Russia needs the economic integration given its traditional economic strategy, which is the export of raw materials, especially energy. Aligning with states such as Kazakhstan in energy and Ukraine in grain, it provides Moscow with leverage in the rest of the world, particularly in Europe. The other face of alignment is trade inside the former Republics’ area. It is currently estimated that almost 70% of Russia’s export receipts are made up of transfer of natural resources and the former Soviet space being recipient of end-products. The heart of Russian strategy is to create a system of relationships within the former Soviet Union’s Republics that will provide economic alignment and strategic depth but not give Russia an unsustainable obligation to underwrite the other nations' domestic policies. The crowing of economic alignment is the Russian Custom Union, which is emerging as free market along the lines of European one.
Focusing on the political side of the strategy only, one of the most ambitious project promoted by Putin is the Eurasia Union, tying together Russia, Kazakhstan and Belarus, a large economic and military part of the former Soviet Union. Ukraine is the missing element and a long, complex, political and economic game is under way considering its importance to Russia in terms of energy revenues, workforce and national security. But despite increasingly warmer ties between Kiev and Moscow, Ukraine continues to develop political and economic relations with the Eu, being on the verge of signing a major trade agreement with Eu.  Ukraine is the most interesting zone of competition between Russia and the Eu and it is fully aware of its strategic power.
Security is the second most important issue concerning the “remaking process”, which ties tight together Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Aiming to have safe borders Russia is trying to hold in its sphere of influence the nearest countries out of NATO’s system, which are the same as the Custom Union, the most important RSS.
Russia wants to strengthen the Western boundaries, following the old but apparently not anachronistic East-West confrontation. More concretely, Poland agreed to host the ballistic missile defense system. Even if it is not a real threat, it is perceived threatening the Russian boundaries and Nation’s integrity. It is still a move on the chessboard.
Concerning the security issue, two scenarios are the hottest: Ukraine and Moldova. After the Orange revolution Ukraine is less and less available giving up with the cooperation with European union, alterning opening and closures’ signals regarding both Russia and Eu. Thus it is not inconceivable its future accession to NATO.
Pulled by Russia and Romania, NATO’s member, Moldova is standing in a situation even more critical than Ukraine. On one hand the Russian 4th  army is stationed in the self-proclaimed majority Russian state of Trans Dniestra while Moscow provides financial assistance to the Government of Tiraspol. At the same time Russia maintains strong bilateral trade links with Moldova and there are calls for the country to join the Russia’s nascent Custom Union. On the other one, the Eu member Romania, which shares language, culture and history with Moldova, is pressing to see the neighbor  actively coopering if not join the Union. 
Once again, looking from above the geographical map of Europe and Asia, two concentric areas are visible: the Countries belonging to the first area are former RSS and not NATO’s members, the others belonging to the second area are NATO’s members and full-fledged or becoming European members.  
At third, the traditional strength of Russia, the energy policy. Moscow has the potential to use its energy supplies such as gas, oil and electricity to maintain a strategic foothold and political leverage in Central and Eastern Europe. Russia remains the largest supplier of energy to Eu and particularly to Eastern Europe, using it as the major foreign policy instrument maintaining the control on the area as it happened against Kiev on at least two occasion in the past six years .
Confirming the strategic importance of those countries, the current efforts to maintain them depending on Russian supplies. When they try to become independent on the energy needs, Russia moves its checkers. For instance the indirect slowdown of Ignalina nuclear plant’s dismissing and on the other hand Russian obstruction to the construction of another nuclear plant in Lithuania, officially announcing that two Russian nuclear plants, stronger than the Lithuanian one, would be built faster in Kaliningrad and Belarus, surrounding the Baltic States.
Despite Russia’s efforts, many Central and Eastern European states have set themselves a multi-vector future course that is not strictly focused on their former Soviet master. Nevertheless, Russia still has enough energy reserves to continue challenging these arrangements and in a short-medium term logic it has leverage enough to keep them into its sphere of influence.  
“But to what extent do the former Soviet Republics look to their old imperial master for security and economic cooperation?”[2] Briefly, below are shown three different tendencies synthesizing the main attitudes towards Russia, crossing the two concentric spheres this article talked about above. Given the relatively strong Russian leverage in all the Countries considered, poles apart are the Baltic States and the former SSR of Belarus and Kazakhstan. Full-fledged members of Eu since 2004 the first three, working for the European integration process sharing its values, economical or ideological they are and pro-Russian the seconds, dependants on Russia and ready to join the integration process within Eurasia Union and Custom Union. The third and middle category concerns the “unsettled States” such as Ukraine and Moldova where are playing contrasting forces.
The second of the two “game tables” mentioned above regards the possible obstacles to the “remaking the Union” Strategy, turning into two others as well.
Since the beginning of war in Iraq and then in Afghanistan, the US were almost completely absorbed and focused on the Middle East. If not ignoring, disregarding the developments of Russian foreign policy, which was an opportunity for Russia to stabilize itself and increase its regional power. Russia must keep the US distracted and its support strategy to the Syrian government and more broadly  in the Middle East serves that purpose.
The European economic crisis is a godsend for Russia as well and in this scenario to draw Germany into a mutually beneficial economic relationship would be the “tremendous achievement” of Russia on this second table. Surely the current situation is awkward for Germany and it cannot be excluded it will start looking for new economical partners to relieve on pressure and to create new possibilities other than Europe. Moreover, Germany depends on Russian gas supplies.
Ultimately, everything  the Russian foreign (shortly domestic?) policy needs, it is to buy time to complete its evolution.
Valentina Lonardi

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